If your an XYZ SIEM user today and your boss is asking you about big data what is our strategy. You probably have RSA, HP and everyone trying to pitch you their new product which solves all problems.
Here is what you need to be doing to start migrating from just SIEM correlation to big data security analytics:
Download and install Elastic Search. Point your XYZ SIEM to forward events to Elastic Search.
Use Kibana to search that data.
Thank me later.
Wednesday, March 27, 2013
Friday, October 19, 2012
Black Hole Exploit Kit 2 (BHEK) summary
This post is just to summarize some quick facts about the problematic BHEK v2. Why problematic? Well this version of exploit kit has risen the bar in sophistication and is harder to detect, defend and find. It's currently driving many of us on the threat ops and intel side crazy so the sharing of information is paramount.
Here is a roundup of data and analysis on BHEKv2:
Great write-up via spider labs
http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/09/blackhole-exploit-kit-v2.html
Malware don't sleep (inside BHEK v2)
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/09/behind-captcha-or-inside-blackhole.html
Excellent analysis by Malware Must Die!
http://malwaremustdie.blogspot.jp/2012/09/following-lead-of-suspected-blackhole2.html
Great analysis by Mila
http://contagiodump.blogspot.fr/2012/09/cve-2012-4681-samples-original-apt-and.html
Download BHEK v2 (partial pack)
http://contagio.deependresearch.org/files/Blackhole2files.zip
Snort signatures:
SOURCEFIRE SNORT
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 25 (msg:"EXPLOIT-KIT Blackhole possible email Landing to 8 chr folder"; flow:to_server,established; content:"href=|22|http|3A 2F 2F|"; content:"/index.html|22|"; within:50; pcre:"/\x2f[a-z0-9]{8}\x2findex\.html\x22/msi"; metadata:policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips drop, service smtp; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:24171; rev:1; )
EMERGING THREATS
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"ET CURRENT_EVENTS Possible Blackhole Landing to 8 chr folder plus index.html"; flow:established,to_server; content:"/index.htm"; fast_pattern:only; http_uri; urilen:20<>21; content:!"search"; nocase; http_uri; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9]+[A-Z]+[A-Za-z0-9]*\/index\.html?$/U"; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2014521; rev:4;)
List of BHEKv2 compromised domains (from contagio):
arksylhet.com
badshahpromotions.co.uk
centroedusantaterezinha.org
chambe-aix.com
colombianfashion.com
curatatorie-sibiu.ro
davidicke.pl
domaister.com
dpwparking.com
ecoaction21.fr
estetiqueroman.ro
fengshuitonight.com
ferretsac.com
firetowerguard.com
groupe-cmb.com
hmlanding.com
innovahogar.es
jusprev.org.br
justwebdesign.co.za
karpar.gr
lehoapaper.com
muzee.org
nailtaxi.com
onewaytransportproducts.com
sloanegroup.com
sv.thanmadailuc.com
trends-und-freizeit.de
ukhs.dk
wnyportal.com
www.golfer360.de
Target Email URLS (from contagio):
http://arksylhet. com/A67iD4eo/index. html
http://arksylhet. com/QSpUShbL/index. html
http://badshahpromotions. co. uk/zpVjiR/index. html
http://centroedusantaterezinha. org/foRHmF8/index. html
http:///Wjn56cM6/index. html
http://chambe-aix. com/yCkWRN/index. html
http://chambe-aix. com/yYiD9SAs/index. html
http://colombianfashion. com/Mt1T26/index. html
http://curatatorie-sibiu. ro/fbwoGoYB/index. html
http://curatatorie-sibiu. ro/QeHis8s/index. html
http://davidicke. pl/0qaSfRv/index. html
http://davidicke. pl/mZbkMz/index. html
http://davidicke. pl/x1s0xB8z/index. html
http://domaister. com/LD2nAc/index. html
http://dpwparking. com/PYG35et/index. html
http://ecoaction21. fr/QBA8Re4S/index. html
http://estetiqueroman. ro/KD31RjXc/index. html
http://fengshuitonight. com/JTARZz/index. html
http://fengshuitonight. com/vRNXQq/index. html
http://ferretsac. com/wBbsvpF/index. html
http://ferretsac. com/wc4hACm/index. html
http://ferretsac. com/z7ShYa3/index. html
http://firetowerguard. com/AEuifWY/index. html
http://groupe-cmb. com/JWBpK7qd/index. html
http://groupe-cmb. com/ukKmLYf0/index. html
http://groupe-cmb. com/zc0XNMxZ/index. html
http://hmlanding. com/60QuVZQ/index. html
http://innovahogar. es/4oRnMr/index. html
http://innovahogar. es/V2dSnzdv/index. html
http://innovahogar. es/ZUCufHc/index. html
http://jusprev. org. br/aZhDGJ1e/index. html
http://justwebdesign. co. za/X1dWrR/index. html
http://karpar. gr/mMDBNKhE/index. html
http://karpar. gr/yoTkZUm0/index. html
http://karpar. gr/yUyj1crG/index. html
http://lehoapaper. com/hUvbnijs/index. html
http://muzee. org/AA9njNS/index. html
http://nailtaxi. com/yjgSuE/index. html
http://onewaytransportproducts. com/auVejpR/index. html
http://sloanegroup. com/1n70Gvt/index. html
http://sv. thanmadailuc. com/9vy1FW/index. html
http://sv. thanmadailuc. com/UotPEhM/index. html
http://sv. thanmadailuc. com/x4MSyKCz/index. html
http://trends-und-freizeit. de/4UDFo4/index. html
http://ukhs. dk/ZjUP5CCZ/index. html
http://wnyportal. com/cKodnh/index. html
http://justwebdesign. co. za/X1dWrR/index. html
Sunday, August 19, 2012
Open-Source Centralized Log Management
With the rise of SIEM and IT operation data mining use-cases many organizations are investing or deciding on how to invest in centralized log management. I'm sure people wonder is there interesting open source alternatives or shall I even bother?
Well it depends, I think there are some great new options to test or keep an eye on, some fantastic mature commercial options and something in-between (Splunk).
So here are the latest a greatest open source options to commercial products such as:
Splunk, Qradar Log Manager , ArcSight Logger, Logrythem, etc.
enterprise-log-search-archive (ELSA)
Perl, MySQL and SOLR based solution which is said to be faster than Splunk at large data sets and seems to have a large following. There is currently no commercial backing or support and it looks that the web interface is highly usable but not rich with visualization options (a trait you will find common in the open source offerings).
http://code.google.com/p/enterprise-log-search-and-archive/
http://vimeo.com/39722091
Sentry
Python and Django based solution by the guys from DISQUS. Seems to be an interesting HTTP based approach and looks high performance. Lots of documentation available, great option for the Python hackers (like me).
http://sentry.readthedocs.org/en/latest/
https://www.wunki.org/posts/2012-01-19-centralized-logging-with-sentry.html
Graylog2
Looks to have the best interface of the group, this is a ROR and ruby based project by the smart folks at XING. Looks to be well maintained and feature rich. Would love to know how it scales.
http://graylog2.org/
LogStash
Java + ROR based streaming log aggregation. Looks very cool, it was created by an ex-google engineer now working at Loggly. Very actively maintained project with lots of documentation and some cool features. This one is definitely worth checking out.
http://logstash.net/
http://www.oscon.com/oscon2012/public/schedule/detail/26347
Logsandra
Another Python based project using Cassandra (NOSQL) backend database. Cool looking project but early stage and does not seem to have a mature UI.
https://github.com/thobbs/logsandra
http://my.safaribooksonline.com/book/databases/9781849515122/libraries-and-applications/ch10lvl1sec12
Scribe
Python based log aggregation tool used by Facebook. Does not seem to be actively maintained or updated in several years :(
https://github.com/facebook/scribe
Unfortunately I cannot speak to the performance, feature or overall quality these solutions. Perhaps when I have more time I can try them out and create some reviews. Enjoy!
Well it depends, I think there are some great new options to test or keep an eye on, some fantastic mature commercial options and something in-between (Splunk).
So here are the latest a greatest open source options to commercial products such as:
Splunk, Qradar Log Manager , ArcSight Logger, Logrythem, etc.
enterprise-log-search-archive (ELSA)
Perl, MySQL and SOLR based solution which is said to be faster than Splunk at large data sets and seems to have a large following. There is currently no commercial backing or support and it looks that the web interface is highly usable but not rich with visualization options (a trait you will find common in the open source offerings).
http://code.google.com/p/enterprise-log-search-and-archive/
http://vimeo.com/39722091
Sentry
Python and Django based solution by the guys from DISQUS. Seems to be an interesting HTTP based approach and looks high performance. Lots of documentation available, great option for the Python hackers (like me).
http://sentry.readthedocs.org/en/latest/
https://www.wunki.org/posts/2012-01-19-centralized-logging-with-sentry.html
Graylog2
Looks to have the best interface of the group, this is a ROR and ruby based project by the smart folks at XING. Looks to be well maintained and feature rich. Would love to know how it scales.
http://graylog2.org/
LogStash
Java + ROR based streaming log aggregation. Looks very cool, it was created by an ex-google engineer now working at Loggly. Very actively maintained project with lots of documentation and some cool features. This one is definitely worth checking out.
http://logstash.net/
http://www.oscon.com/oscon2012/public/schedule/detail/26347
Logsandra
Another Python based project using Cassandra (NOSQL) backend database. Cool looking project but early stage and does not seem to have a mature UI.
https://github.com/thobbs/logsandra
http://my.safaribooksonline.com/book/databases/9781849515122/libraries-and-applications/ch10lvl1sec12
Scribe
Python based log aggregation tool used by Facebook. Does not seem to be actively maintained or updated in several years :(
https://github.com/facebook/scribe
Unfortunately I cannot speak to the performance, feature or overall quality these solutions. Perhaps when I have more time I can try them out and create some reviews. Enjoy!
Monday, July 30, 2012
ArcOSI is now Bad Harvest
ArcOSI has been officially re-named to Bad Harvest and has great new threat intelligence sources in the latest version available now... Get it!
Labels:
ArcOSI,
Arcsight,
Cyber Threat,
ESM,
OSINT,
SIEM,
Threat Intelligence
PPTP VPN is Critically Vulnerable.
Moxie Marlinspike does it again. The eclectic hacker who previously brought you SSLStrip now has released (@ Defcon 20) a utility and advisory on cracking MSCHAPv2 which powers most PPTP VPN.
Get the code here: https://github.com/moxie0/chapcrack
Suggestion is to migrate to OpenVPN for a more secure VPN setup.
Also if your bored read some of his excellent stories
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
Friday, April 13, 2012
Looking for a localhost cacheing nameserver?
Back in the day I would use dnscache and sometimes even bind for local network or localhost cacheing recursive DNS. I was hoping there was a newer, better, faster and easier to setup / maintain solution in 2012....
I found unbound. http://unbound.net/
If you have a server that does tons of DNS lookups (think SIEM), then this is a must.
Debian/Ubuntu:
apt-get install unbound
Redhat/Centos:
yum install unbound
It's secure and listens only on 127.0.0.1 by default. How cool is that?
Lastly don't forget to update resolv.conf...
echo "nameserver 127.0.0.1" > /etc/resolv.conf
I found unbound. http://unbound.net/
If you have a server that does tons of DNS lookups (think SIEM), then this is a must.
Debian/Ubuntu:
apt-get install unbound
Redhat/Centos:
yum install unbound
It's secure and listens only on 127.0.0.1 by default. How cool is that?
Lastly don't forget to update resolv.conf...
echo "nameserver 127.0.0.1" > /etc/resolv.conf
Labels:
DNS Cache Poisoning,
DNS cacheing,
Linux,
SIEM,
sysadmin,
unbound
Thursday, April 12, 2012
Tuesday, April 3, 2012
ArcOSI 30 released
Added new sources, some parsing fixes and the feature to specify a custom port via command line. Currently only the python code is release but will compile the windows binary later today.
Download @ code.google.com/p/arcosi
-Greg
Download @ code.google.com/p/arcosi
-Greg
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
A little about MS12-020
Great history on the vulnerability by the original Italian researcher: http://aluigi.org/adv/ms12-020_leak.txt
He sold the bug to ZDI with a DoS POC, they reported to MS and the bug is suspected to have leaked through a MAPP partner to Chinese entity and surfaced as the rdpclient.exe
Small companies: Firewall off all remote access to 3389
Enterprise: Scan and test, deploy signatures, alert SOC and start monitoring campaign during lockdown efforts
Snort signatures (untested):
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 3389 (msg:”Potential MS12-020 RDP DoS attempt – MaximumParatmers”; flow:to_server,established; content:”|03 00|”; depth:2; content:”|7f 65 82 01 94|”; distance:24; within:5; content:”|30 19|”; distance:9; within:2; content:”|30 19|”; distance:25; within:2;content:”|30 1c|”; distance:25; within:2; byte_test:1,=,255,2,relative; reference:cve,2012-0002; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000031; rev:1;)
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 3389 (msg:”Potential MS12-020 RDP DoS attempt – MaximumParatmers”; flow:to_server,established; content:”|03 00|”; offset:0; depth:2;content:”|7f 65 82 01 94|”;distance:24;within:5;byte_jump:1,10,relative;byte_jump:1,1,relative;byte_test:1,=,255,4,relative; reference:cve,2012-0002; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000026;rev:1;priority:1;)
He sold the bug to ZDI with a DoS POC, they reported to MS and the bug is suspected to have leaked through a MAPP partner to Chinese entity and surfaced as the rdpclient.exe
Small companies: Firewall off all remote access to 3389
Enterprise: Scan and test, deploy signatures, alert SOC and start monitoring campaign during lockdown efforts
Snort signatures (untested):
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 3389 (msg:”Potential MS12-020 RDP DoS attempt – MaximumParatmers”; flow:to_server,established; content:”|03 00|”; depth:2; content:”|7f 65 82 01 94|”; distance:24; within:5; content:”|30 19|”; distance:9; within:2; content:”|30 19|”; distance:25; within:2;content:”|30 1c|”; distance:25; within:2; byte_test:1,=,255,2,relative; reference:cve,2012-0002; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000031; rev:1;)
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 3389 (msg:”Potential MS12-020 RDP DoS attempt – MaximumParatmers”; flow:to_server,established; content:”|03 00|”; offset:0; depth:2;content:”|7f 65 82 01 94|”;distance:24;within:5;byte_jump:1,10,relative;byte_jump:1,1,relative;byte_test:1,=,255,4,relative; reference:cve,2012-0002; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000026;rev:1;priority:1;)
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Wireless fun with your Macbook
Since OSX Snow Leopard there is an Airport wireless API that allows some fun tricks but it takes some minor setup to use it properly...
First make sure you can easily run the new Airport API utility:
sudo ln -s /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Apple80211.framework/Versions/Current/Resources/airport /usr/sbin/airport
Now you have easy ability to scan and sniff packets:
airport scan
And the sexiest feature is to dump packets in monitor mode:
sudo -s airport sniff 11
Note that you still cannot actively inject and sniff without using a realtek USB wifi card.
To stop the airport utility from sniffing drop it into the background and kill the process ID:
ctrl+z
then
sudo -s killall airport
So what kind of attacks are possible without injection? Well any wireless traffic (non encrypted via WEP/WPA/HTTPS) on the channel your sniffing you can then read with a packet inspection tool like tcpdump which comes by default on your Mac. A pcap will be saved in the /tmp directory, simply read it in with tcpdump to see what fun you captured!
Gregs-MacBook-Air:tmp gregmartin$ ls /tmp |grep air
airportSniffmcg8L2.cap
To print the ASCII content of all HTTP traffic:
tcpdump -s0 -Anr /tmp/airportSniffmcg8L2.cap port 80
or
tcpdump -s0 -Anr /tmp/airportSniffmcg8L2.cap port 80 |grep -i pass
Here we see an Android phone at the Boingo wireless captive portal ready to log in!
Of course you can use any libpcap tool such as Wireshark to analyze the resulting file.
First make sure you can easily run the new Airport API utility:
sudo ln -s /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Apple80211.framework/Versions/Current/Resources/airport /usr/sbin/airport
Now you have easy ability to scan and sniff packets:
airport scan
And the sexiest feature is to dump packets in monitor mode:
sudo -s airport sniff 11
Note that you still cannot actively inject and sniff without using a realtek USB wifi card.
To stop the airport utility from sniffing drop it into the background and kill the process ID:
ctrl+z
then
sudo -s killall airport
So what kind of attacks are possible without injection? Well any wireless traffic (non encrypted via WEP/WPA/HTTPS) on the channel your sniffing you can then read with a packet inspection tool like tcpdump which comes by default on your Mac. A pcap will be saved in the /tmp directory, simply read it in with tcpdump to see what fun you captured!
Gregs-MacBook-Air:tmp gregmartin$ ls /tmp |grep air
airportSniffmcg8L2.cap
To print the ASCII content of all HTTP traffic:
tcpdump -s0 -Anr /tmp/airportSniffmcg8L2.cap port 80
or
tcpdump -s0 -Anr /tmp/airportSniffmcg8L2.cap port 80 |grep -i pass
Here we see an Android phone at the Boingo wireless captive portal ready to log in!
Of course you can use any libpcap tool such as Wireshark to analyze the resulting file.
Labels:
Cracking WIFI,
Security,
sniffing,
WIFI,
Wireless Security
Friday, August 12, 2011
Why you don't steal from a hacker
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So during the London riots I return home the next morning to find my flat ransacked and my Macbook Pro laptop stolen!
Police showed up, took a report and dusted for prints, performed typical forensics... One thing they did not expect was that I had installed the amazing open source tracking software from http://preyproject.com
Once I flagged my laptop as missing within Prey, I waited eagerly for the first report to come in. I was concerned he wouldn't be able to get past the login password but he was clever enough to add a new account: Here is how to create a new admin account on a Mac
Almost two weary days had gone by and I'm at dinner on a business trip in Luxembourg and I received an email which nearly knocked me out of my chair with excitement.
Next thing I did was buy a pack of smokes and run back to my hotel room so the games could begin... I cranked up the frequency of reports to one in every five minutes to try to get a screen capture of him using gmail or facebook so I could snag a name or login credentials.
After two hours hours of watching him surf religious revelation videos, shopping for Mercedes A class on autotrader he finally popped onto facebook! This was the treasure trove of information, at this point I had the following:
His Name: Sxxxxx Kxxxx
His School: xxxx School Class of 2009
His address: xxx N End Rd London W14
His IP Address: 90.201.72.xx
His ISP: BSKYB
His wireless AP: SKY378xx
His Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=101952xxx
Of course I had pictures of him from the webcam on my Macbook as well as his Facebook page, now I just had to pass the info on to London Metro police and get to bed at a decent hour as I had to run an all-day meeting the following morning!

The tip of the iceberg, now that all the details were collected, London Metro police could make their move!
And the icing on the cake... justice served. Add me on twitter @gregcmartin lets laugh together!
Monday, April 11, 2011
ArcOSI 2.8 released
Releasing a new and greatly enhanced version of ArcOSI tonight with the following new features:
Config file support
White listing
http and https proxy support
New feeds
Fixed numerous bugs and finally updated the Windows EXE version!
Snag a copy @ http://code.google.com/p/arcosi
Config file support
White listing
http and https proxy support
New feeds
Fixed numerous bugs and finally updated the Windows EXE version!
Snag a copy @ http://code.google.com/p/arcosi
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Samsung Key Logger Mess

So some brilliant writer for network world "Mohamed Hassan (CISSP)", reported based on his anti-virus tool having a false positive finding "Star Logger" key logger installed on his new Samsung Laptop. So the story quickly spread across the blogosphere including engadget and other high profile blogs then was amplified by twitter.
Apparently the AV he ran only looks for "c:\windows\SL" directory. What! This shows the terrible state of A/V software and how poor the detection signature actually can be. Seriously looking for the presence of a directory is extremely poor...
Will be interesting if Samsung sues anyone in this matter as this has not been positive PR for them. And all you blog slinging CISSP's need to slow your roll and stick to blogging about professional's research and not what your laptop's A/V client back.
Other fun A/V fail stories:
McAfee Kills Windows PC's by the thousands
Symantec Nukes Thousands of Chinese PC's
Sources:
http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002133.html
Sunday, March 27, 2011
Message from Comodo hacker
This was copied from: http://pastebin.com/74KXCaEZ
Hello
I'm writing this to the world, so you'll know more about me..
At first I want to give some points, so you'll be sure I'm the hacker:
I hacked Comodo from InstantSSL.it, their CEO's e-mail address mfpenco@mfpenco.com
Their Comodo username/password was: user: gtadmin password: [trimmed]
Their DB name was: globaltrust and instantsslcms
GlobalTrust.it had a dll called TrustDLL.dll for handling Comodo requests, they had resellers and their url was:
http://www.globaltrust.it/reseller_admin/
Enough said, huh? Yes, enough said, someone who should know already knows...Am I right Mr. Abdulhayoglu?
Anyway, at first I should mention we have no relation to Iranian Cyber Army, we don't change DNSes, we
just hack and own.
I see Comodo CEO and others wrote that it was a managed attack, it was a planned attack, a group of
cyber criminals did it, etc. etc. etc.
Let me explain:
a) I'm not a group of hacker, I'm single hacker with experience of 1000 hackers, I'm single programmer with
experience of 1000 programmers, I'm single planner/project manager with experience of 1000 project
managers, so you are right, it's managed by a group of hackers, but it was only I with experience of 1000
hackers.
b) It was not really a managed hack. At first I decided to hack RSA algorithm, I did too much
investigation on SSL protocol, tried to find an algorithm for factoring integer, analyzed existing algorithms, for now I was not
able to do so, at least not yet, but I know it's not impossible and I'll prove it, anyway... I saw
that there is easier ways of doing it, like hacking a CA. I was looking to hack some CAs like Thawthe,
Verisign, Comodo, etc. I found some small vulnerabilities in their servers, but it wasn't enough to
gain access to server and sign my CSRs. During my search about InstantSSL of Comodo which signs CSRs immediately I found
InstantSSL.it which was doing it's job under control of Comodo.
After a little try, I analyzed their web server and easily (easy for me, so hard for others) I got FULL access on the server, after a little investigation on their
server, I found out that TrustDll.dll takes care of signing. It was coded in C# (ASP.NET).
I decompiled the DLL and I found username/password of their GeoTrust and Comodo reseller account.
GeoTrust reseller URL was not working, it was in ADTP.cs. Then I found out their Comodo account works
and Comodo URL is active. I logged into Comodo account and I saw I have right of signing using APIs. I
had no idea of APIs and how it works. I wrote a code for signing my CSRs using POST request to those
APIs, I learned their APIs so FAST and their TrustDLL.DLL was too old and was not working properly, it doesn't send all needed parameters,
it wasn't enough for signing a CSR. As I said, I rewrote the code for !AutoApplySSL and !PickUpSSL
APIs, first API returns OrderID of placed Order and second API returns entire signed
certificate if you pass OrderID from previous call. I learned all these stuff, re-wrote the code and
generated CSR for those sites all in about 10-15 minutes. I wasn't ready for these type of APIs, these
type of CSR generation, API calling, etc. But I did it very very fast.
Anyway, I know you are really shocked about my knowledge, my skill, my speed, my expertise and entire attack.
That's OK, all of it was so easy for me, I did more important things I can't talk about, so if you have to
worry, you can worry... I should mention my age is 21
Let's back to reason of posting this message.
I'm talking to the world, so listen carefully:
When USA and Israel creates Stuxnet, nobody talks about it, nobody blamed, nothing happened at all,
so when I sign certificates nothing should happen, I say that, when I sign certificates nothing should
happen. It's a simple deal.
I heard that some stupids tried to ask about it from Iran's ambassador in UN, really? How smartass you are?
Where were you when Stuxnet created by Israel and USA with millions of dollar budget, with access to SCADA systems and Nuclear softwares? Why no one asked a question from Israel and USA ambassador to UN?
So you can't ask about SSL situtation from my ambassador, I answer your question about situtation: "Ask about Stuxnet from USA and Israel", this is your answer, so don't waste my Iran's ambassador's worthy time.
When USA and Isrel can read my emails in Yahoo, Hotmail, Skype, Gmail, etc. without any simple
little problem, when they can spy using Echelon, I can do anything I can. It's a simple rule. You do,
I do, that's all. You stop, I don't stop. It's a rule, rule #1 (My Rules as I rule to internet, you should know it
already...)
Rule#2: So why all the world worried, internet shocked and all writers write about it, but nobody
writes about Stuxnet anymore? Nobody writes about HAARP, nobody writes about Echelon... So nobody
should write about SSL certificates.
Rule#3: Anyone inside Iran with problems, from fake green movement to all MKO members and two faced
terrorists, should afraid of me personally. I won't let anyone inside Iran, harm people of Iran, harm
my country's Nuclear Scientists, harm my Leader (which nobody can), harm my President, as I live, you
won't be able to do so. as I live, you don't have privacy in internet, you don't have security in
digital world, just wait and see...By the way, you already have seen it or you are blind, is there any larger target than a CA in internet?
Rule#4: Comodo and other CAs in the world: Never think you are safe, never think you can rule the
internet, ruling the world with a 256 digit number which nobody can find it's 2 prime factors (you think so), I'll show
you how someone in my age can rule the digital world, how your assumptions are wrong, you already understood it, huh?
Rule#5: To microsoft, mozilla and chrome who updated their softwares as soon as instructions came from
CIA. You are my targets too. Why Stuxnet's Printer vulnerability patched after 2 years? Because it was
needed in Stuxnet? So you'll learn sometimes you have to close your eyes on some stuff in internet,
you'll learn... You'll understand... I'll bring equality in internet. My orders will equal to CIA orders,
lol ;)
Rule#6: I'm a GHOST
Rule#7: I'm unstoppable, so afraid if you should afraid, worry if you should worry.
My message to people who have problem with Islamic Republic of Iran, SSL and RSA certificates are broken, I did it one time, make sure I'll do it again, but this time nobody will notice it.
I see some people suggests using VPNs, some people suggests TOR, some other suggests UltraSurf, etc. Are you sure you are safe using those? RSA 2048 was not able to resist in front of me, do you think UltraSurf can?
If you was doing a dirty business in internet inside Iran, I suggest you to quit your job, listen to sound of most of people of Iran, otherwise you'll be in a big trouble, also you can leave digital world
and return to using abacus.
A message in Persian: Janam Fadaye Rahbar
[UPDATE 1]: Also check this: http://pastebin.com/DBDqm6Km
Hello
I'm writing this to the world, so you'll know more about me..
At first I want to give some points, so you'll be sure I'm the hacker:
I hacked Comodo from InstantSSL.it, their CEO's e-mail address mfpenco@mfpenco.com
Their Comodo username/password was: user: gtadmin password: [trimmed]
Their DB name was: globaltrust and instantsslcms
GlobalTrust.it had a dll called TrustDLL.dll for handling Comodo requests, they had resellers and their url was:
http://www.globaltrust.it/reseller_admin/
Enough said, huh? Yes, enough said, someone who should know already knows...Am I right Mr. Abdulhayoglu?
Anyway, at first I should mention we have no relation to Iranian Cyber Army, we don't change DNSes, we
just hack and own.
I see Comodo CEO and others wrote that it was a managed attack, it was a planned attack, a group of
cyber criminals did it, etc. etc. etc.
Let me explain:
a) I'm not a group of hacker, I'm single hacker with experience of 1000 hackers, I'm single programmer with
experience of 1000 programmers, I'm single planner/project manager with experience of 1000 project
managers, so you are right, it's managed by a group of hackers, but it was only I with experience of 1000
hackers.
b) It was not really a managed hack. At first I decided to hack RSA algorithm, I did too much
investigation on SSL protocol, tried to find an algorithm for factoring integer, analyzed existing algorithms, for now I was not
able to do so, at least not yet, but I know it's not impossible and I'll prove it, anyway... I saw
that there is easier ways of doing it, like hacking a CA. I was looking to hack some CAs like Thawthe,
Verisign, Comodo, etc. I found some small vulnerabilities in their servers, but it wasn't enough to
gain access to server and sign my CSRs. During my search about InstantSSL of Comodo which signs CSRs immediately I found
InstantSSL.it which was doing it's job under control of Comodo.
After a little try, I analyzed their web server and easily (easy for me, so hard for others) I got FULL access on the server, after a little investigation on their
server, I found out that TrustDll.dll takes care of signing. It was coded in C# (ASP.NET).
I decompiled the DLL and I found username/password of their GeoTrust and Comodo reseller account.
GeoTrust reseller URL was not working, it was in ADTP.cs. Then I found out their Comodo account works
and Comodo URL is active. I logged into Comodo account and I saw I have right of signing using APIs. I
had no idea of APIs and how it works. I wrote a code for signing my CSRs using POST request to those
APIs, I learned their APIs so FAST and their TrustDLL.DLL was too old and was not working properly, it doesn't send all needed parameters,
it wasn't enough for signing a CSR. As I said, I rewrote the code for !AutoApplySSL and !PickUpSSL
APIs, first API returns OrderID of placed Order and second API returns entire signed
certificate if you pass OrderID from previous call. I learned all these stuff, re-wrote the code and
generated CSR for those sites all in about 10-15 minutes. I wasn't ready for these type of APIs, these
type of CSR generation, API calling, etc. But I did it very very fast.
Anyway, I know you are really shocked about my knowledge, my skill, my speed, my expertise and entire attack.
That's OK, all of it was so easy for me, I did more important things I can't talk about, so if you have to
worry, you can worry... I should mention my age is 21
Let's back to reason of posting this message.
I'm talking to the world, so listen carefully:
When USA and Israel creates Stuxnet, nobody talks about it, nobody blamed, nothing happened at all,
so when I sign certificates nothing should happen, I say that, when I sign certificates nothing should
happen. It's a simple deal.
I heard that some stupids tried to ask about it from Iran's ambassador in UN, really? How smartass you are?
Where were you when Stuxnet created by Israel and USA with millions of dollar budget, with access to SCADA systems and Nuclear softwares? Why no one asked a question from Israel and USA ambassador to UN?
So you can't ask about SSL situtation from my ambassador, I answer your question about situtation: "Ask about Stuxnet from USA and Israel", this is your answer, so don't waste my Iran's ambassador's worthy time.
When USA and Isrel can read my emails in Yahoo, Hotmail, Skype, Gmail, etc. without any simple
little problem, when they can spy using Echelon, I can do anything I can. It's a simple rule. You do,
I do, that's all. You stop, I don't stop. It's a rule, rule #1 (My Rules as I rule to internet, you should know it
already...)
Rule#2: So why all the world worried, internet shocked and all writers write about it, but nobody
writes about Stuxnet anymore? Nobody writes about HAARP, nobody writes about Echelon... So nobody
should write about SSL certificates.
Rule#3: Anyone inside Iran with problems, from fake green movement to all MKO members and two faced
terrorists, should afraid of me personally. I won't let anyone inside Iran, harm people of Iran, harm
my country's Nuclear Scientists, harm my Leader (which nobody can), harm my President, as I live, you
won't be able to do so. as I live, you don't have privacy in internet, you don't have security in
digital world, just wait and see...By the way, you already have seen it or you are blind, is there any larger target than a CA in internet?
Rule#4: Comodo and other CAs in the world: Never think you are safe, never think you can rule the
internet, ruling the world with a 256 digit number which nobody can find it's 2 prime factors (you think so), I'll show
you how someone in my age can rule the digital world, how your assumptions are wrong, you already understood it, huh?
Rule#5: To microsoft, mozilla and chrome who updated their softwares as soon as instructions came from
CIA. You are my targets too. Why Stuxnet's Printer vulnerability patched after 2 years? Because it was
needed in Stuxnet? So you'll learn sometimes you have to close your eyes on some stuff in internet,
you'll learn... You'll understand... I'll bring equality in internet. My orders will equal to CIA orders,
lol ;)
Rule#6: I'm a GHOST
Rule#7: I'm unstoppable, so afraid if you should afraid, worry if you should worry.
My message to people who have problem with Islamic Republic of Iran, SSL and RSA certificates are broken, I did it one time, make sure I'll do it again, but this time nobody will notice it.
I see some people suggests using VPNs, some people suggests TOR, some other suggests UltraSurf, etc. Are you sure you are safe using those? RSA 2048 was not able to resist in front of me, do you think UltraSurf can?
If you was doing a dirty business in internet inside Iran, I suggest you to quit your job, listen to sound of most of people of Iran, otherwise you'll be in a big trouble, also you can leave digital world
and return to using abacus.
A message in Persian: Janam Fadaye Rahbar
[UPDATE 1]: Also check this: http://pastebin.com/DBDqm6Km
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Webinar: Integrating Open Source Intelligence with ArcOSI
Join me today for a webinar of how integrating Open Source Intelligence within ArcSight ESM using ArcOSI.
If you would like to register: http://www.arcsight.com/webinars/watch/integrating-open-source-intelligence-osint/
Topics we will cover:
What is OSINT and how has it become a powerful SIEM use cases for 2011. The following webinar will cover:
• Why A/V does not cut it anymore
• How to detect the new threat: APT, client-side, malware
• What OSINT is
• An introduction to ArcSight Open Source Intelligence (ArcOSI)
If you would like to register: http://www.arcsight.com/webinars/watch/integrating-open-source-intelligence-osint/
Topics we will cover:
What is OSINT and how has it become a powerful SIEM use cases for 2011. The following webinar will cover:
• Why A/V does not cut it anymore
• How to detect the new threat: APT, client-side, malware
• What OSINT is
• An introduction to ArcSight Open Source Intelligence (ArcOSI)
Thursday, January 13, 2011
ArcOSI 2.1 Released!

Just uploaded the newest version of ArcOSI Open Source Intelligence Utility for use with ArcSight ESM. I've added several new malware domain feeds and improved the code to handle connection errors, etc. I'm making time for this project now and will soon add support very soon for proxy and proxy-auth as this has been requested numerous times!
Thanks to everyone who has tested and just a reminder feel free to reach out directly if you have any issues, feedback or requests.
http://code.google.com/p/arcosi
-Greg
Monday, October 25, 2010
Monday, October 18, 2010
Security B-Sides DFW Nov 6th

The very first B-Sides security conference in Dallas, TX is coming up Nov 6th and I will present early morning on mass exploitation using Metasploit a cucumber and an iPhone.
Please bring your friends and co-workers who are interested in Security as these conferences are completely free and typically loads of fun.
Hope to see you there, cheers.
http://www.securitybsides.org/BSidesDFW
Monday, September 6, 2010
Amun Honeypot with ArcSight CEF support
Playing around this weekend and created a CEF syslog output plugin for Amun honeypot, here is the sample output (dst IP scrubbed):
Sep 6 19:44:30 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=222.186.27.82,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=DCOM Vulnerability,dpt=135,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Now need to feed these into an ESM active list...
To be nice, I packaged up the CEF enabled Amun honeypot into a 200MB Ubuntu VM so you can try this out in your ArcSight lab or production. Follow the easy directions to re-IP and setup syslog out. You will be nabbing attackers and the latest malware in no time!
***update: I Googled the attacker IP's in the post above and found no mention of them in any open malicious IP lists, this highlights the effectiveness of using honeypots to gather the absolute latest intelligence on hosts attacking your perimeter (and others).
***update 2: VM boot issue fixed, sorry about that!
Sep 6 19:44:30 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=222.186.27.82,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=DCOM Vulnerability,dpt=135,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Sep 6 20:10:46 honeypot1 Amun[32438]: CEF:0|Alchemy Security|Amun|8.0|100|Honeypot Intercepted Malware|src=66.127.110.254,dst=76.78.17.74,msg=NETBIOSNAME Vulnerability,dpt=139,cs1=None
Now need to feed these into an ESM active list...
To be nice, I packaged up the CEF enabled Amun honeypot into a 200MB Ubuntu VM so you can try this out in your ArcSight lab or production. Follow the easy directions to re-IP and setup syslog out. You will be nabbing attackers and the latest malware in no time!
***update: I Googled the attacker IP's in the post above and found no mention of them in any open malicious IP lists, this highlights the effectiveness of using honeypots to gather the absolute latest intelligence on hosts attacking your perimeter (and others).
***update 2: VM boot issue fixed, sorry about that!
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